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Abstract
Although the 25thanniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the beginning of the reunification of post-war
Europe was celebrated on November 9 this past fall, study of Europe continues to be divided into two camps:
East and West. In these past twenty-five years, former Soviet satellites have rebuilt their economies following
the regime change from communism to capitalism. Poland, for example, was the only country in Europe to
show contin-uous positive growth throughout the global financial crisis of 2008 and 2009 (EC, 2014).
Meanwhile, the European Union (EU) has continued to expand, further integrating economies in both
Eastern and Western Europe. In order to gain membership into the Union, a state must demonstrate
commitment to the EU goal of economic integration, which is defined as a six-step process in which economic
and monetary union is merely a step. A decade ago, in 2004, ten additional European countries were granted
accession into the EU after meeting the convergence demands for membership. These ten Central, Eastern,
and Mediterranean countries are Malta, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic,
Slovakia, Slovenia, and Hungary (EC, 2014). The growth of the European Union represents a shared
commitment among its member states – even those in Eastern Europe – to achieve higher degrees of
economic integration. The physical boundary between Eastern and Western Europe has now been long
demolished and the EU’s emphasis on open trade and economic integration has resulted in the shrinking of
economic barriers, but the division between Eastern and Western Europe is still important to the discussion of
contemporary European issues. As an emerging Eastern economy which demonstrated stability through the
Great Recession, Poland will serve as the focal point of this study, which aims to determine if immediate
interest rates in Poland are better explained by those in Eastern or Western European economies. It is an
interesting country to study as it is potentially bridging a previously perceived gap between Eastern and
Western Europe.
This article is available in The Park Place Economist: http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/parkplace/vol23/iss1/10
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I.  Introduction 
 Although the 25th anniversary of the fall of  
the Berlin Wall and the beginning of the reunifica- 
tion of post-war Europe was celebrated on Novem- 
ber 9 this past fall, study of Europe continues to be 
divided into two camps: East and West. In these  
past twenty-five years, former Soviet satellites have 
rebuilt their economies following the regime change 
from communism to capitalism. Poland, for exam- 
ple, was the only country in Europe to show contin-
uous positive growth throughout the global finan- 
cial crisis of 2008 and 2009 (EC, 2014). Meanwhile,  
the European Union (EU) has continued to expand, 
further integrating economies in both Eastern and 
Western Europe. In order to gain membership into  
the Union, a state must demonstrate commitment  
to the EU goal of economic integration, which is 
defined as a six-step process in which economic  
and monetary union is merely a step. A decade ago,  
in 2004, ten additional European countries were  
granted accession into the EU after meeting the 
convergence demands for membership. These ten 
Central, Eastern, and Mediterranean countries are 
Malta, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,  
the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Hun- 
gary (EC, 2014). The growth of the European Union 
represents a shared commitment among its member 
states – even those in Eastern Europe – to achieve 
higher degrees of economic integration. The physi- 
cal boundary between Eastern and Western Europe  
has now been long demolished and the EU’s em- 
phasis on open trade and economic integration has 
resulted in the shrinking of economic barriers, but  
the division between Eastern and Western Europe  
is still important to the discussion of contemporary 
European issues. As an emerging Eastern economy 
which demonstrated stability through the Great  
Recession, Poland will serve as the focal point of this 
study, which aims to determine if immediate inter-  
est rates in Poland are better explained by those in 
Eastern or Western European economies. It is an 
interesting country to study as it is potentially bridg- 
ing a previously perceived gap between Eastern and  
Western Europe.  
 
Immediate interest rates are very short term  
rates which are held for a maximum of twenty-four 
hours. They include rates for business loans, inter- 
bank rates, or call money rates which pertain to  
money left at the disposal of a bank (OECD, 2005).  
In this study, these rates will be measured as a risk 
premium, which is the difference between the rate of 
interest and another which serves as a baseline.  
Studying the risk premium as opposed to the inter- 
est rate itself provides a point of comparison between 
changes in the Polish rate and changes in the interest  
rate of the base country. Moreover, the nature of the 
calculation to determine a risk premium makes it an 
ideal measure of convergence, which would be rep-
resented by a decrease in the risk premium of Polish 
rates. The European Union emphasizes convergence  
of interest rates as a goal to achieve greater economic 
integration because a fixed or common interest rate 
contributes to free movement of resources (EC 2013). 
The German interest rate is commonly used as the  
base country in similar studies because the Ger- 
man economy has remained relatively stable since 
the foundation of the European Union, making it a  
sound candidate as the basis of convergence goals.  
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The period of study begins in 2002, when the Euro  
first began to circulate as paper and coin currency.  
This is the ideal point of initiation as it maximizes the 
length of the study while ensuring that the German 
interest rate is not subject to volatility due to change  
in currency during the study period. Data extracted  
from the FRED Database compiled by the St. Louis  
Fed shows that the immediate interest rate in Poland 
 has decreased from a peak of 12% in January of 2002  
to 2.8% as recently as December 2013, which can be 
observed in Figure 1 in the Appendix (FRED, 2014).  
In this study, multivariate linear regression will be 
utilized to explain changes in the Polish interest rate  
risk premium as a function of the same risk premium for 
other European countries in both Eastern and  
Western Europe.   
 
II. Literature Review 
The existing literature on risk premiums on 
interest rates in the European Union is extensive, but 
not exhaustive. Although both short and long term 
rates are represented, very little research has been 
conducted using immediate rates. The use of 
immediate rates for a time series analysis provides 
data which reacts much more quickly to changes in 
perceived risk than a longer term bond, drawing 
from existing theory. Seminal to the discussion is the 
theoretical paper from John Cox et al., titled “A 
Theory of the Term Structure of Interest Rates” 
(1985). This work formulates a relationship between 
both long and short term bond prices, consumer 
maximizing behavior and rational expectations.  Risk 
aversion is one of the factors influencing consumer 
preferences. Cox et al. explain that a risk premium 
may account for differences in bond prices that 
cannot be explained by differences in the pay 
structure of the bond itself if consumers deem one 
type of bond to carry higher risk than another.   
 
Although Cox et al. primarily discuss risk in 
terms of the length of maturity of the bond, research-
ers have expanded on this seminal theoretical work 
by examining other determinants of financial risk, 
such as region or level of international economic 
integration. Such work has been conducted either   
by developing more specific theoretical models, or 
by using data to empirically test existing theories or 
determine relationships between variables.  In the 
article entitled “Regional Lending Risk in Eurodol-
lar Markets,” Sten Thore studies Eurodollar mar- 
kets instead of the government bonds that Cox et  
al. have examined (1986).  Eurodollar markets are 
more closely related to exchange rates than interest 
rates, referring to the value of the U.S. dollar when 
it is used outside the United States. Thore develops 
the literature by calculating risk premiums which 
capture a premium on the interest rates of regions 
classified as higher risk due to factors ranging from 
corruption to unfavorable economic trends.  Thore’s 
study includes Eurodollar markets in regions in 
South America and Asia as well as in Europe. 
Conversely, Baele et al. connect the study of risk 
premiums specifically to the European Union in the 
article “Measuring European Financial Integration” 
(2004). Financial integration is measured across the 
countries in the Eurozone with five variables, 
including two types of bonds. Baele et al. build on 
Cox et al.'s time-varying risk premiums by 
comparing local interest rates to the euro area 
interest rate. This comparison is emphasized to 
assess the level of economic integration throughout 
EU member states; if domestic interest rates and 
euro area interest rates are converging, this is 
consistent with the furtherance of the Union’s goals 
to achieve higher levels of economic integration. 
Baele et al. theorize that integration will occur more 
rapidly with short term bonds than long term bonds. 
This hypothesis is important to note in the 
continuation of our study, since it reveals that an 
examination of long term rates may yield different 
results from a study of immediate interest rates.  
 
Existing literature also includes empirical tests 
of the seminal theoretical paper, including Caporale’s 
"Domestic and External Factors in Interest Rate De-
termination" (1997).  In this paper, determinants of 
German interest rates are analyzed both as a function 
of rates in the European Monetary System and in 
other European countries.  This is similar to the appr-
oach used in our study, which explains variation in 
Polish risk premiums discounted by the German rate 
using similar risk premiums in countries which do not 
use the Euro.  
 
The existing body of work on the determinants 
of changes in interest rates, both long and short term, 
is very diverse. This study is similar to previously 
conducted empirical works because it uses region, 
through European economic integration, as the 
primary determinant of change in interest rates. 
However, our study includes data through December 
2013 which is more recent than most empirical tests 
conducted to date.  
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III. Data and Methodology 
The data employed to conduct this study are taken 
from the FRED Database compiled by the St. Louis 
Federal Reserve Bank.  The immediate interest rates 
have a time series structure, and have been col-lected 
monthly from January 2002 to December of 2013.  For 
each country studied, there are 144 observa-tions.  
Because Germany has maintained a relatively stable 
economy and has even emerged as a financial supporter 
of the European Union throughout this time period, it 
will be used as the reference point for calcu-lating risk 
premiums.  Moreover, Germany’s immedi- 
ate rates are effectively identical to the immediate rates 
in all other Eurozone countries. This fact negates the 
need to address risk premiums among countries using the 
euro.  The Polish risk premium will be compared 
to that of the Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, the 
Slovak Republic, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.   
 
Polish Risk Premium
 
= α + β1 (Danish Risk 
Premium)
 t-1 + β2 (Hungarian Risk 
Premium)
 t-1 + β3 (Slovak Risk Premium) + 
β4 (Swedish Risk Premium) t-1 + β5 (British 
Risk Premium) + ε 
 
Interest rates are measured in percentages, as is the 
standard practice.   
 
To compile the data, each series was extracted 
into MS Excel directly from the FRED database. Data 
for countries which did not include data from every 
month of every year throughout the studied time period 
were eliminated. This criterion eliminated data for 
Estonia and Slovenia as they were only available 
beginning in the years 2007 and 2004, respectively.  
 
Data from countries which had kept suffi- 
ciently longitudinal and reliable records were exported 
into the EViews statistical package for further analy-
sis.  Seasonal means were observed, and overall the 
data showed little evidence of seasonality. However, 
in Hungary and the Czech Republic, there is a very 
slight January effect.  This means that the interest rates 
are typically higher in January than other months as a 
result of the beginning of a new fiscal year.  In the Slo-
vak Republic, a stronger January effect was observed, 
showing a monthly mean of almost one full percentage 
point above the average. Data were seasonally adjusted 
before proceeding. 
 
 
As can be observed in the data plots in the 
appendix, the risk premium for all countries in the 
study except for Sweden decreases over time.  The 
Swedish risk premium instead increases over time. 
The Polish case is interesting, especially consider-ing 
the aims to meet European Union convergence goals. 
 Figure 1 clearly illustrates that from 1999 until 2007, 
the Polish immediate interest rate rap-idly dropped to 
almost meet the rate in the euro zone.  However, 
presumably as a result of the finan-cial crisis of 
2008-2009, the interest rates diverge once more and 
do not show promising signs of re-convergence based 
on the time plot depicted.  The maximum value of the 
Polish risk premium was recorded at 17.07 
percentage points in late 2000.  Conversely, the 
minimum value was recorded early in 2007 at 0.56 
percentage points.   
 
The lowest risk premium throughout the  
studied time period is observed in Denmark; figure 3 
shows that the immediate interest rates in Denmark  
and in the euro-zone are nearly identical. Figure 4  
clearly illustrates a spike in the Danish risk premium 
in late 2008. At a glance, this peak seems to suggest a 
major deviation from the steadily downward slope of 
the trend, but a comparison to figure 3 clarifies that 
this is likely the result of a lagged response to the Great 
Recession of 2008.  The plot of the risk premium in 
every country displays oscillation around either an 
upward or downward sloping trend.  This is evidence 
of the presence of business cycles.  Two business cycles 
can be counted in all countries except Poland, where 
only one business cycle is evident.  
 
After performing these basic assessments of the 
data, multivariate regression will be conducted using 
the Ordinary Least Squares method.  The equation 
employed is as above.  
 
         In the above equation, the independent vari- 
able is the Polish risk premium, which will depend on 
the following dependent variables: the risk premium of 
the previous month in Poland, Denmark, Hungary, the 
Slovak Republic, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 
These countries were chosen because of data avail-
ability, and because they represent both emerging  
and developed European Union economies outside  
the euro zone. Because of the trends in the existing 
literature, I expect that the coefficients of Eastern Eu-
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ropean countries should have positive signs and the 
highest magnitudes, since they should best explain 
changes in economic variables in Poland as fellow 
Eastern European countries. The diversity of these 
variables as well as the large range of observations are 
strengths in this study.  
 
IV. Results 
  Prior to running a regression to test the 
relationship between the Polish risk premium on 
immediate interest rates and those of other European 
countries in this study, it was necessary to conduct 
standard transformations to the data to ensure reli-
ability. This involved ensuring that the series is both 
seasonally adjusted and stationary. A stationary series 
has constant mean and variance over time. If  
a series is not stationary, running a regression may 
result in a false positive. Data were seasonally ad-
justed in EViews using the additive moving average  
 
Polish Risk Premium = -0.185 + 
2.718(Czech Risk Premium) + 
2.822(Danish Risk Premium) 
+0.599(Hungarian Risk Premium) – 
2.867(Swedish Risk Premium) + 
2.868(British Risk Premium) + 2.506(Polish 
Risk Premium)
 t-1 + ε 
 
method.  This method was chosen over any multipli-
cative method because some of the data is less than 
zero, so it would be impossible to seasonally adjust 
using, for example, the multiplicative Census X12 
method. Next, data for each country was subjected to 
the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) and Kwiat-
kowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) tests to check 
for unit roots and stationarity, respectively. If a series 
contains a unit root, it cannot be stationary. The null 
hypothesis of the ADF test is that the series contains a 
unit root. If the p-value of the t-statistic of the ADF test 
is less than 0.05, one can reject the null hypoth-esis 
with 95% confidence, therefore implying that the series 
is stationary. Conversely, the null hypothesis of the 
KPSS test is that the series is stationary. If the p-value 
of the t-statistic of this test is greater than 0.05, one 
fails to reject the null hypothesis. So, the series is 
stationary. Each test was conducted both in levels and 
in first order differences of their logarithmic values. In 
levels, the values of the data are the risk premiums of 
immediate interest rates; in first order differences, the 
values of the data are rates of change of the risk 
premiums of immediate interest rates. The results of 
these tests are tabulated in Table 1 of the Appendix. For 
most countries, the results of both the ADF and KPSS 
tests show that the series are stationary in first order 
differences but not in levels. For Poland and the Czech 
Republic, both the ADF and KPSS tests suggest that 
the series is not stationary in levels. However, in first 
order differences, the ADF test shows the series  
is stationary, whereas the p-value of the KPSS test is 
still below 0.05, suggesting that the series is still not 
stationary in first order differences.  For Hungary, the 
null hypothesis of the ADF test in levels as well as that 
of the KPSS test in first order differences can be mar-
ginally rejected. This presents some ambiguity, how-
ever, the results of the KPSS test in levels and the ADF 
test in first order differences are consistent with the 
other countries. Therefore, it is appropriate to conduct 
the remainder of this study analyzing the series in first 
order differences which are stationary, instead of the 
series in levels which are not.  
 
         Listing the first order differences of the  
Polish risk premium as the dependent variable and 
those of the Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom as the indepen-
dent variables, a preliminary regression was run.  The 
coefficients for the variables of Hungary and  
the Czech Republic were not statistically significant, 
since the p-values associated with their t-statistics 
were not lower than 0.05. Therefore, the null hypoth-
esis that the coefficients are statistically equivalent 
to zero could not be rejected.  An alternative regres-
sion was run excluding these two variables, and the 
remaining coefficients were significant.  How- 
ever, residual diagnostic tests for homoskedasticity 
showed that the residuals of the regression were 
heteroskedastic, or that their variance was not con-
stant.  Another regression was run, this time includ-
ing a lagged value of the Polish risk premium as an 
independent variable alongside those of the five base 
countries.  For this regression, all coefficients were 
significant.  The estimated parameters of that regres-
sion are as shown in the previous equation.  
 
        The value of each coefficient represents the 
percentage of change in the Polish risk premium 
which can be explained by a ten percent change in  
the value of the relevant coefficient. A negative sign 
indicates an inverse relationship between the two 
variables, or that domestic immediate interest rates 
move in the opposite direction of the German imme-
diate interest rate.  So, the Polish risk premium can be 
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expected to decrease as the Swedish rate increases, but 
will increase as the same rate increases in the Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Hungary, and the United King-
dom. The rates in all countries of study are comple-
mentary to one another except Sweden, for which the 
rate is a substitute. Therefore, an investor facing unfa-
vorable changes in immediate interest rates in Den-
mark may choose to operate in the Swedish financial 
markets instead where the rates would be changing in 
the opposite direction.  
 
The positive relationship between Polish risk 
premiums and that of the United Kingdom is par-
ticularly telling, since London has functioned for  
years as the financial capital of the world.  Immediate 
interest rates in Poland are well predicted (relative to 
other variables in this regression) by British imme-
diate interest rates, and move in the same direction 
with respect to those in Germany and, therefore, the 
Euro Zone.  A positive relationship also still exists 
between Polish risk premiums and those of Hungary 
and the Czech Republic, but had lower explanatory 
power than expected, relative to the United Kingdom. 
In fact, the variable with the least explanatory power is 
the Hungarian risk premium. This defies the ex-
pectation that Hungary, as a fellow emerging Eastern 
European economy, would be a strong predictor for 
behavior of Polish financial markets. As expected, this 
series exhibits inertia as proven by the positive sign of 
the coefficient associated with the lagged variable.  The 
magnitude of the coefficient of the lagged term is 
2.506, which is higher only than that of the Hungarian 
risk premium. This implies that changes in the Polish 
risk premium are generally better predicted by chang-
es in financial markets of other European countries 
than the previous month’s risk premium in Poland. 
  
         Descriptions of the robustness of this regres-sion 
(as well as the values of the coefficients) are presented 
in Table 2 in the Appendix. The overall goodness of fit 
of the regression is captured in the Ad-justed R-
squared, which is chosen over the R-squared because 
it includes a penalty for the number of in-dependent 
variables in the equation. The Adjusted  
R-squared is 0.310, which means that the equation can 
explain 31% of variation in the Polish risk premium  
of immediate interest rates. For time series data, this  
is a relatively high Adjusted R-squared, so the model  
is effective in explaining variation in the dependent 
variable.  To complete the discussion of residual 
diagnostics, a plot of the residuals can be found in the 
Appendix, labeled Figure 1. The null hypothesis of  
the Jarque-Bera test for normality must be rejected,  
so the residuals are not normally distributed.  Hetero-
skedasticity tests indicate that the residuals are homo-
skedastic, so their variance is relatively constant. The 
Lagrange Multiplier test was used to determine if the 
series exhibits autocorrelation. With two lags, we fail 
to reject the null hypothesis that there is no auto-
correlation in the series. Overall, despite the lack of 
normality in the residual distribution, residual diag-
nostics suggest that this model is reliable.  
 
V. Conclusions 
         Existing literature has largely divided Eu- 
ropean economies and financial markets into two 
camps: East and West, or Emerging and Developed.   
Twenty-five years after the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union, many former Soviet satellites continue to strive 
for convergence and integration with the core of the 
European Union.  As Eastern European economies 
continue to meet EU convergence demands, it be- 
comes less and less useful to divide European econo-
mies along these lines.  
 
          In this study, data from the FRED Database  
on immediate or overnight interest rates were used to 
calculate risk premiums for Poland, the Czech Re-
public, Denmark, Hungary, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom. The basis for all of these risk premiums 
was Germany, which acted as a proxy for the Euro 
zone. Monthly data were collected from these coun-
tries from 2002 to 2013, adding up to a total of 143 
observations (after adjustments). Estimations were 
based on the commonly accepted idea that economies 
of former Soviet satellite countries are likely to share 
more in common with one another than those in 
Western Europe. However, ultimately the hypothesis 
that risk premiums of the Czech Republic and Hun-
gary would be most useful in predicting the Polish 
risk premium were refuted.  It would be impossible  
to say definitively, based on this study, that Polish 
financial markets can be better predicted by either the 
Western or Eastern economies exclusively.  The result 
is that the independent variables from either side of 
the continent are important in determining changes in 
Polish financial markets.  This is consistent with the 
findings from Caporale's study on domestic and exter-
nal determinants of interest rates (1997). In this study, 
Caporale finds that German policies are affected by, 
to a significant degree, the policies of other European 
countries both inside and outside the European Mon-
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etary System.  Similar integration is seen in this study, 
especially as the economic interdependence of Euro-
pean countries increased as the European Union itself 
has expanded. 
 
 In the future, additional studies should be 
conducted testing financial indicators other than 
immediate interest rates, specifically an interest rate 
with a longer term. Five year government bonds may  
be examined for this purpose. Currency exchange  
rates could also be a potential measure of integration  
in a similar study. Fitting an ARMA model or similar 
forecasting equation is another potential avenue for 
continuing research in order to see how trends of con-
vergence or divergence may be expected to continue in 
the future. 
 
          Ultimately the results of this study suggest that 
it is no longer accurate to separate European econo-
mies into two camps. It has been a decade since the 
2004 expansion of the European Union to include an 
additional ten countries, including Poland. Since this 
time, EU convergence demands are continuing to be 
met and these economies create more distance from 
the communist regime of the Soviet Union.  
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Figure 1 – Plot of Polish Immediate Interest Rates (levels, %) 
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Figure 3 
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Figure 4 
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Figure 5 
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Figure 6 
                    Immediate Interest Rates in Hungary and Germany (%) 
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Figure 7 
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Figure 8 
           Immediate Interest Rates in the Slovak Republic and Germany (%) 
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Figure 9 
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Figure 10 
                    Immediate Interest Rates in Sweden and Germany (%) 
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Figure 11 
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Figure 12 
         Immediate Interest Rates in the United Kingdom and Germany (%) 
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Figure 13 
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Figure 14 
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Figure 15 
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Figure 16 
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Figure 17 
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Figure 19 
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Figure 20 
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Figure 21 
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Table 1 – T-statistics of Stationarity Tests 
 Levels First Order Differences 
ADF KPSS ADF KPSS 
Germany -1.5412 20.451*** -4.8091*** -1.3473 
Poland -1.4786  18.989*** -4.2209*** -2.0319** 
Czech Republic -1.6392 18.610*** -5.4737*** -3.7248*** 
Denmark -1.4297  21.031*** -4.631*** -1.4558  
Hungary -2.8283* 37.384*** -14.528*** -1.720* 
Sweden -2.3548 25.213*** -10.686*** -0.1302 
United Kingdom -1.1944  21.075*** -4.8240*** -1.5368 
Significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10%(*) levels  
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Table 2 – Estimation Results 
  
Constant -0.0185 
(-1.0975) 
Czech Republic 0.2718*** 
(2.4047) 
Denmark 0.2822*** 
(2.3996) 
Hungary 0.0599*** 
(2.1999) 
Sweden -0.2867*** 
(-3.8164) 
United Kingdom 0.2868*** 
(2.6820) 
Poland(t-1) 0.2506*** 
(4.1229) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.3103 
Standard Error of the Regression 0.1962 
LM (2) 1.2873 
Normality 37.087*** 
Breusch-Godfrey 1.3628 
White's Test 1.8993* 
Significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10%(*) levels (T-values in parenthesis)  
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